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Defending Miranda*
by Paul Marcus**
INTRODUCTION

I write to defend the Supreme Court's decision in Miranda v. Arizona. 1
It may seem odd to feel the need to defend a well-established Supreme
Court decision issued more than twenty years ago. In recent years, however, a strongly critical drive led by representatives of the United States
Justice Department 2 has received much publicity in the call to overrule
Miranda. I believe Miranda is good law, is good policy, and has an important and positive impact on our society. Before turning specifically to the
Court's decision, however, it is important to consider generally the debate over the use of confessions in criminal cases. After all, that really
is what Miranda is all about.
What are we to do about confessions? Some would say they are a vital part of our criminal justice system and all should be done to encourage
them. Indeed, on a panel recently with a police chief of a major metropolitan area, I heard the chief speak about how Miranda has interrupted the
developing ''art of interrogating and eliciting confessions.'' I am not sure
exactly what the "art" is, but he spoke in glowing terms of confessions
as the cornerstone of our criminal justice system.
*This essay is based upon a lecture given in March 1988, at the University of Wyoming College of Law.
**Dean and Professor of Law, University of Arizona College of Law.
1. 384 u.s. 436 (1966).
2. In February 1986, the Office of Legal Policy of the United States Justice Department issued a lengthy report discussing the use of confessions in criminal cases. See U.S.
DEPT. OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF LEGAL PoLICY, REPORT TO THE ATTORNEY GENERAL ON THE
LAW OF PRE· TRIAL INTERROGATION (Feb. 12, 1986) [hereinafter JusTICE DEPT. REPORT]. The
Report concluded by noting that
Miranda v. Arizona was a decision without a past.... Miranda v. Arizona is
a decision without a future .... [It] drifts on twenty years later, a derelict on
the waters of the law. There is every reason to believe that an effort to correct
this situation would be successful.... The potential benefits from success in
this effort are very great.
ld. at 114-15.
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Others, on the other hand, such as Dean Wigmore, have been more
circumspect in their review of confessions. He has stated that "any sys·
tern of administration which permits the prosecution to trust habitually
to compulsory self-disclosure as a source of proof, must itself suffer
morally thereby." 3 And, as Justice Goldberg pointed out in Escobedo v.
Illinois:4
We have learned the lesson of history, ancient and modern, that
a system of criminal law enforcement which comes to depend on
the "confession" will, in the long run, be less reliable and more
subject to abuses than a system which depends on extrinsic evi·
dence independently secured through skillful investigation. 5
Actually, most people, and I put myself in this group as well, fall somewhere between the harsh criticism of the use of confessions found in Dean
Wigmore's writings, and Justice Goldberg's opinion in Escobedo, and the
kind of trusting heavy reliance that my police chief friend would place
on confessions. I suspect most of us would have little difficulty in relying
heavily on the confession if we were absolutely convinced that it was given
in a free and voluntary sense, with the suspect making a knowing and
informed decision to speak.
DISCUSSION

The Voluntariness Test

In much of our history, the only real question in connection with con·
fessions was simply the voluntariness issue: did the defendant freely and
knowingly speak? The voluntariness test, of course, arose under the due
process clause. For most of our history, and the rule continues today, the
test has been as stated by Justice Frankfurter:
Is the confession the product of an essentially free and uncon·
strained choice by its maker? If it is, if he has willed to confess,
it may be used against him. If it is not, if his will has been over·
borne and his capacity for self-determination critically impaired,
the use of his confession offends due process. 6
The voluntariness test works very well in the extreme and revolting
cases which, unfortunately, we have seen throughout our history. An
example is Brown v. Mississipp~ 7 where the suspect was hanged by a rope
to the limb of a tree, whipped, whipped again, and told that the whippings
would continue until he confessed. He confessed. His confession was certainly involuntary. Consider also Brooks v. Florida, 8 where the defendant
was ordered confined for thirty-five days in a very small cell with no fur·
3. Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478, 489 (1964) (quoting 8 J. WIGMORE, EviDENCE
at 309 (3rd Ed. 1940)).
4. 378 u.s. 478 (1964).
5. ld. at 488·89 (footnote omitted).
6. Culombe v. Connecticut, 367 U.S. 568, 602 (1961).
7. 297 u.s. 278 (1936).
8. 389 u.s. 413 (1967).
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nishings and was given a restricted diet consisting entirely of peas and carrots in a soup form three times daily. The defendant confessed after spending fourteen days incommunicado. His confession was also ruled involuntary. Alas, such cases are not necessarily ancient history. While Brown
was a 1936 case and Brooks a 1967 case, there are also more recent cases
such as Leon v. State, 9 decided in 1982. There the police "threatened and
physically abused [the defendant) by twisting his arm behind his back and
choking him until he revealed where [the victim] was being held." 10 In these
extreme cases the voluntariness test seems to work reasonably well. 11
What of cases, however, in which we do not see physical violence,
where the threats and pressure involved are more subtle, or where there
is genuine confusion as to whether or not the suspect really understands
the guaranteed rights? Consider, for instance, Lynumn v. Illinois. 12 The
suspect there was arrested for dealing in narcotics. The officer told her
that she could receive ten years for this offense and her children would
be taken away. She testified at the trial, that the arresting officer told
her that "after I got out they would be taken away and strangers would
have them, and if I could cooperate he would see that they weren't; and
he would recommend leniency and I had better do what they told me if
I ever wanted to see my kids again. " 13 The two children were three and
four years old. Recall also cases such as Jurek v. Estelle, 14 where the defendant was arrested at one o'clock in the morning, was kept away from his
family for almost two full days, was not given an attorney, was moved
three to four times during this period, and the evidence showed that he
had a verbal I.Q. of sixty-six.
In cases like Lynumn and Jurek, the voluntariness test becomes much
more difficult to apply. Moreover, the voluntariness test really requires
the appellate courts to sit essentially as jurors to determine whether or
not the facts bear out the conclusion that the defendant's statement was
freely and openly given. In addition, sole reliance on the due process provisions of the fifth and fourteenth amendments neglects treatment of
other constitutional provisions which affect the use of confessions. Illegal
searches under the fourth amendment which result in confessions - every
law student's nightmare, the fruit of the poisonous tree problem15 - affect
the admissibility of the statements. 16 The sixth amendment right to coun9. 410 So. 2d 201 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1982).
10. Id. at 202.
11. The court in Leon, surprisingly, held that the confession had been voluntarily given,
as the purpose of the police action was to find the victim and save his life, not to get a confession. Id. at 203.
12. 372 u.s. 528 (1963).
13. Id. at 531.
14. 593 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1979), rev 'den bane, 623 F.2d 929 (1980).
15. Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963), in its reliance on "tainted fruit"
and "purged" and "attenuated" evidence, remains a considerable source of confusion and
terror in the basic criminal procedure course.
16. In Dunaway v. New York, 442 U.S. 200 (1979), the defendant was unlawfully arrested
and taken to the police station. There he was given his Miranda warnings, and he confessed.
The confession was found to be inadmissible under the fourth amendment because it was
the direct result of the illegal detention.
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sel is also very important because it deals with the issue of a suspect's
right to confer with an attorney in connection with questioning. 1' And
focusing exclusively on the due process clause neglects the fifth amendment privilege against self-incri~ation. 18
The Decision in Miranda

In the late 1950s and early 1960s Justices of the Supreme Court were
frustrated. They were hearing a large number of confession cases focusing on voluntariness rules. The Court attempted to deal with confession
problems in a host of different ways, such as by requiring prompt appearances before magistrates 19 and giving guidelines with respect to the use
of physical force in connection with confessions. 20 Still, nothing worked
in a great many cases. The cases kept coming, the fact patterns were egregious, and ultimately, seemingly in utter frustration, five members of the
Court decided to adopt a rule.
Now there are some, and Justice Harlan is certainly among them, who
bristle at having a rule. After all, our Supreme Court is not permitted to
give policy recommendations or advisory opinions because of the case or
controversy requirement. 21 Justice Harlan railed against what he referred
to as the Supreme Court's "new code" of criminal procedure in Miranda. 22
Still, it seems to me, that having a clear and straightforward rule has
served both suspects and law enforcement officials well. Indeed, I have
always been puzzled by the firestorm created by Miranda. Police officers
were given virtual "carte blanche." If they gave the Miranda warnings,
the odds were excellent that the confession would be admissible. Miranda
should also have encouraged legislative activists. The Court told legislators that following Miranda would essentially insure that confessions will
be admissible. Yet legislators were encouraged to experiment and provide
rights that are equal to those provided under Miranda. The Court specifically stated that:
We encourage Congress and the States to continue their laudable
search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the rights of
the individuals while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal laws. However, unless we are shown other procedures which
are at least as effective in apprising accused persons of their right
of silence and in assuring a continuous opportunity to exercise
it, the [Miranda] safeguards must be observed. 23
17. See, e.g., Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964); Brewer v. Williams, 430

u.s. 387 (1977).

18. The fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimination was incorporated to apply
against the states in Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964), just two years before Miranda.
19. Resulting in the sCH:alled McNabb/Mallory rule. See McNabb v. United States, 318
U.S. 332 (1943); Mallory v. United States, 354 U.S. 449 (1957).
20. See, e.g., Beecher v. Alabama, 389 U.S. 35 (1967) [hereinafter Beecher I); Beecher
v. Alabama, 408 U.S. 234 (1972) [hereinafter Beecher II).
21. u.s. CONST. art. III, §2.
22. 384 U.S. at 516 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
23. ld.. at 467 (majority opinion).
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It appears, however, that legislative activists have declined the Court's
invitation to search for increasingly effective ways of protecting the
accused's rights while promoting efficient enforcement of our criminal
laws. 24

What, then, did the Supreme Court write in Miranda? Was the holding confusing, lengthy, complicated, difficult to understand? Not at all.
The holding in Miranda is straightforward and simple and has been printed
on thousands of little cards that police officers carry around with them
all the time. What the Court said was that under the fifth amendment
privilege against self-incrimination, if two preconditions are met, warnings have to be given in connection with police interrogation. What are
the preconditions? First, this ruling does not apply unless the person is
in custody, unless that individual's freedom of movement has been limited
in a significant way. 25 So when the IRS agents come to your house, and
in that informal setting ask you some questions, Miranda simply does
not apply. 26 When you go to the police station, on a purely voluntary basis,
not being directed to come there, Miranda does not apply because you
are not in custody. 27 Second, the confession must be one which was
given in response to interrogation. Now it does not have to be formal questioning - it can be actions designed to elicit a response - but there has
to be some form of interrogation. 28 So, when the suspect is being fingerprinted or photographed and blurts something out, Miranda does not
apply.
If the suspect is in custody and is interrogated, in order for the state-

ment to be admissible against the defendant to prove his guilt at trial, 29
he has to be given four warnings. The warnings do not have to be in set
form, 30 nor do they have to be in writing. Still, the gist of these warnings
must be given: (1) you have the right to remain silent; (2) anything you
say can and will be used against you; (3) you have a right to have an attorney with you during the questioning; and (4) if you can't afford an attorney, we'll get you one for free.
That is it. That is all Miranda requires. All the warnings can fit on
a little three by five card; every school child watching television or the
24. The only attempt to legislatively overrule Miranda resulted in a codification of the
voluntariness test. See 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1982).
25. Generally, the determination of whether an interrogation was "custodial" is a ques·
tion of fact which is to be made on a case-by-case basis. See United States v. Phelps, 443
F.2d 246, 247 (5th Cir. 1971). The most important facts are those which indicate that the
accused had, or did not have, an objectively reasonable belief that he was not free to leave
the interrogation. Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984); see also Oregon v. Mathia·
son, 429 U.S. 492, 496 (1977) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
26. See Beckwith v. United States, 425 U.S. 341 (1976).
27. See Mathiason, 429 U.S. at 492.
28. See Rhode Island v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291 (1980).
29. A major limitation is that the earlier statement can be used at trial to challenge
the defendant's contrary trial testimony, to impeach or discredit the testimony. See Harris
v. New York, 401 U.S. 222 (1971).
30. See California v. Prysock, 453 U.S. 355 (1981).
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movies knows the warnings. 31 Those are the rules, nothing more technical than that.
Why then do we hear this great furor? Why is it that Miranda has
generated controversy which continues twenty years after it was decided
and we hear calls for the overruling of Miranda? First, I believe that this
great controversy, in fact, is not much of a controversy. The furor is not
much of a furor; the calls to overrule Miranda are relatively few and far
between. Essentially, you hear these calls from a few law professors 32 and
a few individuals in the Reagan administration's Justice Department. 33
You do not generally hear them from police officers, police chiefs or
prosecuting attorneys throughout the United States. Criminal justice
professionals who have studied the issues, by and large, appear to support Miranda, or at least they do not strongly ask for its overruling. As
I will point out later, 34 even some vociferous critics of Miranda have essentially stopped their criticism and accepted the reality that the opinion is
here to stay.
The Criticism

I will focus here on the three principal points made by critics of
Miranda: first, that it is not soundly based constitutional law, looking to
the language and the history of the fifth amendment; second, that the
system does not work, the warnings have become rote, and there are better ways of handling the problem; third, that it really works too well, that
fewer people confess, and the fears at the time of Miranda still apply.
The fifth amendment provides in part that: "No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a witness against himself." The chief argument traditionally put forth by the critics of Miranda, and especially
Justice Harlan, is that neither the text of the fifth amendment nor its
historical development prior to 1966 supports the rule in Miranda. The
fifth amendment language, of course, provides little direct support for
Miranda, but instead raises all sorts of questions: does the constitutional
principle apply only to the trial setting, does it apply only to physical com·
pulsion, does it involve pretrial confrontations? Few have argued that the
language itself strongly supports the conclusion that compulsion under
the fifth amendment is somehow synonymous with coercion under the
voluntariness test of the Due Process Clause. 35
31. Ample precedent exists to demonstrate the point. From the sphere of television,
see Miami Vice, Police Story, and Jake and the Patman for particularly careful renditions
of the warnings. From the world of cinema, see Mel Gibson in Lethal Weapon, Eddie Murphy in 48 Hours, and Sylvester Stallone in Nighthawks, where prominent recitations of the
warnings were featured.
32. See Caplan, Questioning Miranda, 38 VAND. L. REv. 1417 (1985); Grano, Miranda
v. Arizona and the Legal Mind: Formalism's Triumph over Substance and Reason, 24 AM.
' CRIM. L. REV. 243 (1986).
33. See JusTICE DEPT. REPORT, supra note 2.
34. See infra notes 52, 59-62 and accompanying text.
35. This point is made forcefully by the author of the JusTICE DEPT. REPORT, supra
note 2. See Markman, Miranda v. Arizona: A Historical Perspective, 24 AM. CRIM. L. REv.
193 (1986).
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It is also fair to say that the historical development concerning the
fifth amendment lent little direct support to the Miranda ruling. It was
only a few years before Miranda that the self-incrimination clause was
even applied to the states. 36 Prior to 1966, the interpretation issues surrounding the self-incrimination clause primarily revolved around situations in which defendants were literally compelled to speak by threat of
physical coercion or specific penalty. 37

Some critics also contend that Miranda does not work well in enforcing constitutional principles. Undoubtedly this is correct to some extent,
for conviction rates remain high and confession use continues throughout the nation. 38 Moreover, it is asserted, there are better ways of handling the problem in terms of devices which will insure that confessions
are not compelled: set time limits on interrogations, video taping of interrogations, and the infusion of neutral magistrates into the questioning
process. 39
The final argument, and perhaps the major one offered by most critics
of Miranda, is to the contrary: Miranda impedes effective law enforcement
because it works far too well. The critics argue that there is empirical evidence to support the view that Miranda has caused fewer confessions to
be used, hampering the investigation of serious crimes. In addition, the
argument is made that it is difficult to discern the extent of the damage
because the widespread communication of information about Miranda has
led to individuals being unwilling to talk, totally apart from any police
conduct relating to interrogation. 40
In Defense

I want now to take the opportunity to respond to the points which
have been raised. First, as to whether Miranda is soundly based constitutional law, I believe that it is.U It is undoubtedly true that the language
of the fifth amendment, as written, does not directly support the holding
in Miranda. It is also true that historically the founders did not explicitly,
or even implicitly, seem to have in mind the requirements set forth in
Miranda. Still, these conclusions should not be dispositive. The Constitution is not a detailed set of writings requiring us to fix on specific words
with a precise meaning of provisions which never changes. What we look
to is a living, vital Constitution which can change during the course of
a lifetime, and certainly during the course of a 200-year history. Perhaps
it is true that the drafters' original intent was not to have the Miranda
36. See Malloy, 378 U.S. at 1.
37. See JusTICE DEPT. REPORT, supra note 2.
38. The major studies respecting confession use and Miranda warnings are now quite
dated. Moreover, even as to these studies, great debate has raged as to their reliability. See
Schulhofer, Reconsidering Miranda, 54 U. CHI. L. REv. 435 (1987); Markman, The Fifth
Amendment and Custodial Questioning: A Response to "Reconsidering Miranda", 54 U. CHI.
L. REV. 938 (1987).
39. See JusTICE DEPT. REPORT, supra note 2.
40. See Markman, supra note 35.
41. See generally White, Defending Miranda: A Reply to Professor Caplin, 39 VAND.
L. REV. 1 (1986).
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result; so be it. Original intent can indeed be looked to as a beacon or as
a source of inspiration as to where we should be going and where we have
been.
We have never, however, felt locked in by original intent and properly
so for several reasons. It is rarely clear what the original intent was. Are
we looking to the states of mind of the draftsmen of the actual amendment, those who voted for it, those who were in Congress at the time, the
majority of the population at the time? Also, times change, conditions
change, and we certainly will not lock ourselves in forever to a particular
and narrow reading of the Constitution. Probably the clearest example
of this is Gideon v. Wainwright. 42 Undoubtedly the drafters never
imagined that an individual would have to be told of a right to have a
lawyer present during court proceedings, pretrial proceedings, and posttrial proceedings, and that the state would provide an attorney. Fundamental fairness and a changing sense of sixth amendment requirements,
however, have altered that view. Even Chief Justice Rehnquist, a strong
opponent of broad readings of the Constitution, has affirmed Gideon. 43
For some, the major problem with Miranda is that warnings are
required, and that it is the warnings regarding remaining silent and having a lawyer present which are the chief culprits. It is clear, however, that
we require warnings in other settings with hardly a blink of the eye. Again,
Gideon is an excellent example of this point. We would never imagine that
an individual could waive her right to counsel without having first been
expressly advised that she had a right to her own lawyer or a state provided attorney. While it is also true that the Supreme Court has refused
to extend warning requirements to other areas, 44 those other areas do not
42. 372 u.s. 335 (1963).
43. Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979). See also Chief Justice Burger's comment regard·
ing unarticulated rights in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 579-80
(1980):
The State argues that the Constitution nowhere spells out a guarantee
for the right of the public to attend trials, and that accordingly no such right
is protected. The possibility that such a contention could be made did not escape
the notice of the Constitution's draftsmen; they were concerned that some
important rights might be thought disparaged because not specifically guaran·
teed....
But arguments such as the State makes have not precluded recognition
of important rights not enumerated. Notwithstanding the appropriate caution
against reading into the Constitution rights not explicitly defined, the Court
has acknowledged that certain unarticulated rights are implicit in enumerated
guarantees. For example, the rights of association and of privacy, the right
to be presumed innocent, and the right to be judged by a standard of proof
beyond a reasonable doubt in a criminal trial, as well as the right to travel,
appear nowhere in the Constitution or Bill of Rights. Yet these important but
unarticulated rights have nonetheless been found to share constitutional protection in common with explicit guarantees. The concerns expressed by Madison and others have thus been resolved; fundamental rights, even though not
expressly guaranteed, have been recognized by the Court as indispensable to
the enjoyment of rights explicitly defined.
I d.
44. Note especially the Court's refusal to require warnings in connection with consent
searches. Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218 (1973).
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deal with an individual's own words, coming out of her own mouth, which
would seem to necessitate a requirement of a warning that you do not
have to talk and you can have the assistance of counsel.
It is also argued that Miranda does not work. It is difficult for me
to take this argument too seriously. As a matter of common sense and
instinct, we all know that it does work. ' 5 Essentially we all now know that
we have the right to remain silent and we have a right to an attorney;
the Miranda warnings reinforce this knowledge. Moreover, one of the key
points with regard to the effectiveness of the warnings is not simply focus·
ing on the defendant's understanding of his rights. While information
about the warnings is widespread, undoubtedly some defendants do not
understand the rights or lose sight of them during a period of great emo·
tion. More to the point, however, is the question of whether the police
are willing to communicate to the defendant that they, the police officers,
not only know the suspect's right, but by reciting those rights are willing
to enforce and respect those rights. 46

Miranda has done its job, it has communicated constitutional rights
to individuals, and it reiterates those rights in highly emotionally charged
settings. Moreover, I suppose I would ask the question that if Miranda
does not work, what would? Would one replace Miranda with a specific
statute talking about time limits, video tapes, perhaps the infusion of an
independent magistrate? Perhaps such statutes would work well, although
I am not at all convinced they would work better than Miranda. Miranda
specifically invited the legislatures of the states and the federal govern·
ment to experiment in the area. Have we seen such statutory approaches?
Not at all.4 7 What we have seen has been a blatant and heavy-handed
attempt to legislatively overrule Miranda and return to the voluntariness
test. ' 8 Is that the test that we want, voluntariness, a case-by-case
approach? The voluntariness test easily disposes of the physical violence
cases. Unfortunately, it is much less easily applied to the defendant who
is not very intelligent, the highly tense situation, the mentally ill defendant, or cases of official deception.
If the objection truly is that Miranda works too well, the critics prove
too much. If those critics mean that individuals understand their rights
now and may exercise those rights based upon a knowing and rational
understanding of the constitutional principles, that is precisely what our
Constitution stands for. We ought to applaud such a result. If those critics
mean that conviction rates have dropped tremendously and that we see
45. We instinctively know that Miranda works because the information concerning fifth
amendment warnings has been communicated to virtually each and every citizen of the United
States. Moreover, as pointed out by numerous supporters of Miranda, as well as a few critics,
there has been no major impact of Miranda on conviction rates throughout the United States.
See supra note 38 and infra notes 49, 50 and 52 and accompanying text.
46. See generally Schulhofer, supra note 38.
47. Former Attorney General Meese is about the only official who has recently advocated a legislative attempt to overrule Miranda. See JusTICE DEPT. REPORT, supra note 2.
48. With the passage of 18 U.S.C. § 3501 which provides in part, "a confession ...
shall be admissible in evidence if it is voluntarily given."
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many fewer confessions forming the basis for convictions, to be charitable I would say the evidence, at best, is mixed. 49
Most of the studies cited by the critics are old, and much has changed
in the last twenty years in terms of police officer training, court systems,
and perceptions of individual rights. Conviction rates remain high; confession use appears to remain high. Indeed, as strong a critic of Miranda
as Professor Caplan has indicated in a recent interview that essentially
no one really knows what the impact of Miranda has been. Professor
Caplan put the matter in rather striking terms: "So there's a lot of bullshit out there, because lawyers like to quote statistics when they don't
have answers. " 50 Then District Attorney of Philadelphia, Arlen Spector,
was highly critical of Miranda in testimony before a congressional committee in 1966. 51 Twenty years later, Spector, now a United States Senator from Pennsylvania, noted that "whatever the preliminary indications
were twenty years ago, I am now satisfied that law enforcement has
become accommodated to Miranda and therefore I see no reason to turn
the clock back." 52 Indeed, Senator Spector's administrative assistant
explained that the Senator's sharp criticism in 1966 "was based on statistics gathered during a period of obvious transition, a time when the police
were still in the process of getting used to Miranda.' '53
The imagined horribles put forth twenty years ago, and which continue to be raised today, about how the use of Miranda will cripple the
criminal justice system have not come to pass. Instinctively we know
Miranda has worked and its impact on the criminal justice system has
not been detrimental. 54
CoNCLUSION

The Supreme Court has not been overwhelmingly technical in applying Miranda when determining when a suspect is in custody. 55 The Court
has not required any rigorous adherence to the precise wording of the warnings in Miranda. 56 If a suspect takes the stand and then lies at trial about
a prior confession, that prior confession can be used to impeach him. 57 The
fact, albeit the disputed fact, is that Miranda works and works well. Those
who were most critical when Miranda was first written have either tempered their criticism or have withdrawn it. 58 Former Chief Justice Burger
49. See generally Schulhofer, supra note 38.
50. "The impact of the case has been ideological rather than empirical." Quoted in
Thompson, Miranda Decision Still Stands After 2().. Year Debate, L.A. Daily J., June 13, 1986,
at 1.
51. Controlling Crime Through More Effective Law Enforcement: Hearings Before the
Subcomm. on Crim. Law, Sen. Comm. on the Judiciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 200-19 (19671.
52. Quoted in Kamisar, Landmark Ruling's Had No Detrimental Effect, Boston Globe,
Feb. 1, 1987, at A27.
53. Kamisar, No Evidence of Harmful Effect, L.A. Daily J., Feb. 13, 1987, at 1.
54. See supra note 45.
55. Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 420 (routine traffic stop is not custodial).
56. Prysock, 453 U.S. at 355.
57. Harris, 401 U.S. at 222.
58. See, e.g., Senator Spector's co=ents, supra notes 51·53 and accompanying text.
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stated: ''The meaning of Miranda has become reasonably clear and law
enforcement practices have adjusted to its strictures; I would neither overrule Miranda, disparage it, nor extend it at this late date." 59 Justice White
wrote: "We reconfirm these views ... [that) under Miranda [a suspect has
a right] to remain silent and to be free of interrogation 'until he had consulted with a lawyer.' " 60 Justice O'Connor stated: "Were the court writing from a clean slate, I could agree with its holding [narrowing Miranda].
But Miranda is now the law and, in my view, the Court has not provided
sufficient justification for departing from it or for blurring its now clear
strictures." 61 She said again that Miranda as written, "strikes the proper
balance between society's legitimate law enforcement interests and the
protection of the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights.'' 62
Twenty years ago when Miranda was handed down the strongest
critics of the decision were federal and state legislators who viewed the
holding with tremendous alarm. I suppose it is a sign of how far we have
come in accepting the basic principle behind Miranda that I can note that
it is precisely those legislators who now embrace Miranda in a very different setting. I refer here to the efforts to expand Miranda to the noncustodial income tax investigation setting. Fifty-one senators recently
introduced a bill which, if passed, would require revenue agents to allow
investigated taxpayers the right to record the interviews. 5 3 The bill would
also require that the agent "explain the audit process to the taxpayer and
such taxpayer's rights under such process. If the taxpayer indicates in
any manner and at any time during the interview that he wishes to consult with an attorney ... such interview shall be discontinued .... " The
bill, known as the "Omnibus Taxpayers' Bill of Rights Act", is widely
supported by, among others, Senators D'Amato, Hatch, Helms, and
McCain. In addition, many nonpolitical groups throughout the country
have urged support for a model bill which would require the IRS to give
Miranda-type warnings to taxpayers. 64
In short, if the most stringent of the critics of twenty years ago agree
that Miranda works and agree that it ought not to be changed, we should
agree as well. Indeed, to a very large extent, the substance of the debate
over Miranda is irrelevant. The questions, it seems to me, ought to be
what do we do about spiraling drug use, how do we identify and apprehend criminals, how do we process them in our system quickly, and what
do we do about a prison population that is exploding in numbers. Miranda
is essentially irrelevant to these matters. Soon after he stepped down as
head of the National Crime Commission, now Harvard Law Dean James
Vorenberg explained the impact of Miranda on the crime rate:
59. Innis, 446 U.S. at 304.
60. Edwards v. Arizona, 451 U.S. 477, 485 (1981).
61. New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 660 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring in part
and dissenting in part).
62. Moran v. Burbine, 475 U.S. 412, 424 (1986).
63. S. 1774, lOOth Cong., 1st Sess. (1987).
64. This "Bill of Rights" has been widely disseminated throughout the United States.
I recently received a copy in conjunction with a written fund raising effort by a well-known
charitable foundation.
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When one considers that many of the crimes committed in this
country are not reported to the police at all, that only one-fourth
or one-fifth of the crime that is reported leads to arrest, and that
only a small proportion are cases where a confession is crucial to
solution; and when one also takes into account that in many cases
since Miranda the suspect still confesses and that in many cases
before Miranda he did not, what you are left with is "maybe a fraction of 1 percent of all crime that might be affected by a change
in the Miranda rule. " 65

Miranda was good law twenty years ago, in 1966, and it should be
kept, reaffirmed, and strengthened. Miranda communicated rights to
individuals and made clear to law enforcement officials that they are bound
by specific professional standards. It was good law and policy then, as
it is today.

65. Quoted in Kamisar, supra note 53.

